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 † Assistant Professor of Law, U.C. Irvine. These are a modified version of the remarks I delivered at a 
panel on at Hastings Law Journal’s 2019 Symposium about the jurisprudence of Justice Kennedy. My remarks 
focus on Justice Kennedy’s jurisprudence on abortion, which illustrates the promises and limits of the Justice’s 
commitment to a jurisprudence of institutionalism, dignity, and civility. 
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I.  INSTITUTIONALISM 
People often talk about the Chief Justice, Justice Kagan, and Justice Breyer 
as the institutionalists on the modern Supreme Court.1 And that’s true, they are. 
Those Justices care about the Court as an institution and the Court’s reputation. 
They do not want people to look at the Court as a set of politicians in robes; and 
they do not want people to see judges as having ideological or partisan agendas. 
That is how they think of themselves, and they are willing to make compromises 
to maintain that image of the Court, and to set aside their personal beliefs in 
order to preserve the legitimacy of the Court.  
But several of Justice Kennedy’s decisions about abortion show that he too 
has a commitment to institutionalism.  
The first case is Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. 
Casey.2 In that case, the Supreme Court was asked to overturn Roe v. Wade.3 
The Court heard Casey on the heels of several presidential campaigns during 
which candidates promised to appoint Justices who would overturn Roe v. 
Wade.4 But by a narrow vote, the Supreme Court opted not to overturn Roe. 
Justice Kennedy joined the controlling plurality, which said that even if Roe was 
wrongly decided, the Court would not overturn the case and that doing so would 
be retreating “under fire.”5 
 
 1. See, e.g., Josh Gerstein, Justice Elena Kagan: Overlooked Turncoat on Health Care Law?, POLITICO 
(July 5, 2012, 1:32 PM), https://www.politico.com/blogs/under-the-radar/2012/07/justice-elena-kagan-
overlooked-turncoat-on-health-care-law-128095; Jeffrey Rosen, Welcome to the Roberts Court: How the Chief 
Justice Used Obamacare to Reveal His True Identity, NEW REPUBLIC (June 28, 2012), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/104493/welcome-roberts-court-how-chief-justice-used-obamacare-reveal-his-
true-identity (“Roberts now faces similar attacks from the left and right over the health care case for the 
compromise he forged with the pragmatic liberals, Elena Kagan and Stephen Breyer, over the Medicaid 
expansion.”). 
 2. 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (plurality opinion) (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 3. Id. at 844 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)). 
 4. For work discussing the politics of abortion, see Cary Franklin, Roe as We Know It, 114 MICH. L. REV. 
867 (2016) (reviewing MARY ZIEGLER, AFTER ROE: THE LOST HISTORY OF THE ABORTION DEBATE (2015)); 
Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 373, 381–430 (2007). 
 5. Casey, 505 U.S. at 867 (“So to overrule under fire in the absence of the most compelling reason to 
reexamine a watershed decision would subvert the Court’s legitimacy beyond any serious question.” (citing 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“[I]t should go without saying that the vitality of th[e] 
constitutional principles [announced in Brown I,] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement 
with them.”))). 
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How does that decision reveal the Justice’s commitment to 
institutionalism? Embracing stare decisis, particularly on an issue like abortion 
which has a clear ideological valence, shows the Justice’s commitment to the 
Court as an institution. It signals a willingness to uphold the decisions of the 
institution, and to make the institution bigger than any of the individual people 
who are part of it. And it is particularly notable that the Justice chose the 
institution over his own views about the law when his own views about the law 
likely coincided with his own personal policy preferences.6 That is, the 
institution outweighed not only the Justice’s own beliefs about the law, but also 
the Justice’s own beliefs about right and wrong. 
Some people will say that a Justice’s beliefs about right and wrong—or at 
least a Justice’s sense about what is right and what is wrong—should never enter 
into constitutional analysis. But there are some instances where right and wrong 
can and probably should factor into legal analysis.7 For example, in Bolling v. 
Sharpe, the Court held that the Fifth Amendment prohibited the federal 
government from providing segregated education, even though the Fifth 
Amendment does not contain a guarantee of equal protection of the laws.8 The 
Court reasoned that “it would be unthinkable” that the Constitution would permit 
the federal government, but not the states, from imposing racial segregation in 
public education.9 It requires a real commitment to institutionalism to be able to 
know when one’s views about substantive justice should enter into a case, and 
when they should not, or when they should be subordinated to the reputation of 
the institution of the Court.  
The second case is Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.10 Whole 
Woman’s Health was decided in one of the Justice’s last terms on the Court. The 
case essentially asked the Court if it would honor the compromise that it had 
struck in Casey. Casey chose not to overturn Roe, and to affirm its central 
holding that women have a constitutional right to decide to end a pregnancy.11 
And Casey clarified that laws “that have the purpose or effect of presenting a 
 
 6. For example, in a passage in Gonzales v. Carhart, discussed infra, the Justice wrote this about abortion: 
“While we find no reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women 
come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained. Severe depression and loss 
of esteem can follow.” 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007) (citation omitted). The choice to highlight an argument that 
concededly has “no reliable data” to support it provides some indication about the Justice’s own personal views 
or beliefs. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 853 (“[T]he reservations any of us may have in reaffirming the central holding 
of Roe are outweighed by the explication of individual liberty we have given combined with the force of stare 
decisis.”). 
 7. Richard Fallon has discussed the role of substantive justice in constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Theory of Judicial Candor, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2265, 2291 (2017); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1797 & n.29 (2005); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., How 
to Choose a Constitutional Theory, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 535, 562–72 (1999). 
 8. 347 U.S. 497 (1954). 
 9. Id. at 500. 
 10. 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016). 
 11. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Our adoption 
of the undue burden analysis does not disturb the central holding of Roe v. Wade, and we reaffirm that holding.”). 
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substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion” are unconstitutional 
because they “impose an undue burden” on women’s right to decide to end their 
pregnancies.12 
Whole Woman’s Health asked the Court if it was serious about that 
standard. That is, would the Court actually police laws that were “unnecessary 
health regulations,” where no evidence indicated that the laws would help the 
health or safety of any women seeking abortions?13 And would the Court police 
laws that shut down some number of clinics or abortion providers, making 
access to safe abortion more difficult? 
The law at issue in Whole Woman’s Health would have required abortion 
providers to obtain admitting privileges at a hospital within thirty miles of where 
they perform abortions.14 It also would have required abortion clinics to comply 
with the requirements applicable to ambulatory surgical centers.15 There was no 
evidence that either requirement improves the health or safety of abortion, or 
helps any woman seeking an abortion. Literally. Justice Breyer asked the 
Solicitor General of Texas at oral argument if there was any such evidence, and 
the Solicitor General had to answer no.16 No district court could find any 
evidence that an admitting privileges requirement would have helped any 
woman.17 There was also no reason for abortion clinics to comply with the 
requirements for ambulatory surgical centers. Abortions are not surgeries; 
medication abortion does not even involve any medical devices; and surgical 
abortions rely on the body’s natural openings, rather than surgically made 
incisions. Some of the ambulatory surgical center requirements were also 
aesthetic or design-like requirements that had nothing to do with safety 
whatsoever. 
The restrictions also would have closed over thirty of the forty clinics in 
Texas.18 The remaining clinics (about seven of them) all were concentrated in 
major metropolitan areas. The district court summarized its findings in this way: 
[The] number of women of reproductive age living in a county . . . more than 150 
miles from a provider increased from approximately 86,000 to 400,000 . . . and 
the number of women living in a county more than 200 miles from a provider 
from approximately 10,000 to 290,000.19 
The restrictions did not improve the safety of abortion, or the health or 
safety of women seeking abortions, but they did reduce access to abortion by 
 
 12. Id. at 878. 
 13. See id. at 879. 
 14. Whole Woman’s Health, 136 S. Ct. at 2296. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 2311–12. 
 17. Id. at 2312 (citing Planned Parenthood of Wis., Inc. v. Van Hollen, 94 F. Supp. 3d 949, 953 (W.D. Wis. 
2015); Planned Parenthood Se., Inc. v. Strange, 33 F. Supp. 3d 1330, 1378 (M.D. Ala. 2014)). 
 18. Id. at 2316 (“The parties stipulated that the requirement would further reduce the number of abortion 
facilities available to seven or eight facilities, located in Houston, Austin, San Antonio, and Dallas/Fort Worth.”). 
 19. Id. at 2313 (alterations in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Lakey, 46 F. Supp. 3d 673, 681 (W.D. Tex. 2014)). 
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shuttering clinics. And if the Court allowed Texas to enact those restrictions, 
then it would have rendered Casey largely toothless.20 Upholding the restrictions 
would have meant that states could enact regulations on abortion that closed 
most, if not all, of the clinics in a state, without having to show that the 
regulations actually improved the health or safety of abortion.21 
Upholding the restrictions also would have gone back on Casey in more 
formal ways as well as practical ones. Casey affirmed the core holding of Roe 
that women have a constitutionally protected, fundamental right to decide to end 
their pregnancies. Whereas the dissenters in Roe would have applied rational 
basis review to determine if the restrictions were valid,22 the plurality in Casey 
rejected rational basis review as the correct standard.23 
But upholding the regulations in Whole Woman’s Health would have 
required the Court to apply rational basis review, since there was no evidence 
that the law actually furthered its purported purpose. In Whole Woman’s Health 
v. Cole, the court of appeals upheld the Texas regulations on the ground that 
courts should not “substitute[] [their] own judgment[s] for that of the legislature” 
in part because “medical uncertainty underlying a statute is for resolution by 
legislatures, not the courts.”24 In other words, the court of appeals said that a law 
was constitutional if “it is reasonably related to (or designed to further) a 
legitimate state interest.”25 But that is the rational basis standard that the Court 
rejected in Casey. As the Supreme Court wrote in Whole Woman’s Health when 
it rejected the courts of appeals’ “articulation of the relevant standard” as 
“incorrect”: “[It] is wrong to equate the judicial review applicable to the 
regulation of a constitutionally protected personal liberty with the less strict 
review applicable where, for example, economic legislation is at issue.”26 
Whole Woman’s Health makes clear that it is not enough to speculate that 
a law might further some legitimate interest, or to say that the legislature 
 
 20. See Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When “Protecting Health” 
Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1444–73 (2016). 
 21. See id.; Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, The Difference a Whole Woman Makes: Protection for 
the Abortion Right After Whole Woman’s Health, 126 YALE L.J.F. 149 (2016); Leah M. Litman, Unduly 
Burdening Women’s Health: How Lower Courts Are Undermining Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 116 
MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 50 (2017). 
 22. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (“The test traditionally applied 
in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not a law such as that challenged has a rational 
relation to a valid state objective.”); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 966 (1992) 
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“[W]e think that the correct analysis is that set forth by the plurality opinion in 
Webster. A woman’s interest in having an abortion is a form of liberty protected by the Due Process Clause, but 
States may regulate abortion procedures in ways rationally related to a legitimate state interest.”). 
 23. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876 (opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.) (“In our view, the undue 
burden standard is the appropriate means of reconciling the State’s interest with the woman’s constitutionally 
protected liberty.”). 
 24. Whole Woman’s Health v. Cole, 790 F.3d 563, 572, 587 (5th Cir. 2015), rev’d, Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 
2292. 
 25. Id. at 572. 
 26. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. at 2309. 
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reasonably thought it would further some legitimate interest. Rather, a state has 
to show the law actually does so. And that makes a difference to the Casey 
standard because “if a law does not amount to an unconstitutional burden if 
courts can invent a justification for it, then laws would be upheld even when 
there is no evidence that they would help any woman, ever.”27 
In Whole Woman’s Health, Justice Kennedy joined the five-three majority 
invalidating the Texas restrictions.28 And that vote honored the commitment to 
the institution of the Court and to the principles of stare decisis that he had made 
in Casey.  
I don’t want to make too much of those decisions. The Justice certainly had 
a muscular commitment to judicial supremacy, and he was not shy about 
overturning cases.29 His final majority opinion on the Court, South Dakota v. 
Wayfair, overturned a major Dormant Commerce Clause decision.30 In that case, 
the Chief Justice wrote a strong dissent sounding in institutionalist concerns.31 
And even the decisions I highlighted above show only a partial 
commitment to institutionalism. In Casey, even though the Court retained the 
core holding of Roe, the Court modified the controlling standard that is used to 
evaluate whether abortion restrictions are constitutional. Casey declared that it 
was no longer the case that regulations on abortion had to satisfy the strict 
scrutiny standard. Rather, they would only have to satisfy the lesser undue 
burden standard.32 The dissenters in Casey33 called the Court’s decision a 
“Potemkin village” of stare decisis and Roe—picking and choosing what aspects 
of a prior ruling to retain, and which to jettison, and modifying the applicable 
law in the process.34 
 
 27. Leah Litman, Opinion, A So-Called Victory Shows How the Supreme Court Will Kill ‘Roe v. Wade,’ 
WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-so-called-victory-shows-how-the-
supreme-court-will-kill-roe-v-wade/2019/02/08/9229852a-2bd3-11e9-b2fc-
721718903bfc_story.html?utm_term=.03ee152b3c9f. 
 28. The case was decided during the term that Justice Scalia had passed away. 
 29. See Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cty. & Mun. Emps. Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2460 (2018) (“Abood 
is therefore overruled.”); Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 365 (2010) 
(“Austin . . . should be and now is overruled.”). 
 30. 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2099 (2018) (“For these reasons, the Court concludes that the physical presence rule 
of Quill is unsound and incorrect. The Court’s decisions in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota and National Bellas 
Hess, Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Ill. should be, and now are, overruled.” (citations omitted)). 
 31. See Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2102 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“This is neither the first, nor the second, 
but the third time this Court has been asked whether a State may obligate sellers with no physical presence within 
its borders to collect tax on sales to residents. Whatever salience the adage ‘third time’s a charm’ has in daily 
life, it is a poor guide to Supreme Court decisionmaking.”). 
 32. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992) (plurality opinion) (opinion of 
O’Connor, Kennedy & Souter, JJ.). 
 33. The opinions were formally concurrences, but would have upheld all of the requirements and adopted 
a different legal standard. 
 34. Casey, 505 U.S. at 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissent in part) (“The sum of the joint 
opinion’s labors in the name of stare decisis and “legitimacy” is this: Roe v. Wade stands as a sort of judicial 
Potemkin Village, which may be pointed out to passers-by as a monument to the importance of adhering to 
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There are also other counter-examples. In Gonzales v. Carhart, Justice 
Kennedy wrote an opinion upholding a federal restriction on abortion by 
applying what looked, in some ways, like rational basis review. The Partial-Birth 
Abortion Act of 2003 prohibited a particular dilation and evacuation procedure, 
and it did so, the law declared, in order to avoid the “further coarsen[ing] [of] 
society to the humanity of not only newborns, but all vulnerable and innocent 
human life, making it increasingly difficult to protect such life.”35  
Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Carhart did not meaningfully inquire into 
whether the law actually furthered its purported objectives.36 And there was little 
evidence that the partial dilation and evacuation procedure led to physicians who 
were uncertain about or slippery with their ethical obligations. There was also 
little evidence that the availability of the procedure did coarsen society to 
humanity. The Court nonetheless upheld the law.37 And it discounted the 
burdens that the law imposed on women (particularly women with certain 
medical conditions) on the ground that there was medical uncertainty about the 
effects the law would have.38  
In a passage the court of appeals in Whole Woman’s Health relied on, 
Justice Kennedy wrote: “The Court has given state and federal legislatures wide 
discretion to pass legislation in areas where there is medical and scientific 
uncertainty.”39 And he offered completely unsubstantiated speculation to 
support the conclusion that the law furthered a valid purpose, which is 
inconsistent with the standard Casey articulated.40 Whole Woman’s Health later 
pointedly recognized that courts and legislatures cannot offer unsupported 
speculation as a basis for upholding a law that restricts in abortion.41 Yet in 
Carhart, Justice Kennedy wrote:  
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the 
mother has for her child. The Act recognizes this reality as well. Whether to have 
an abortion requires a difficult and painful moral decision. While we find no 
reliable data to measure the phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude 
 
precedent. But behind the facade, an entirely new method of analysis, without any roots in constitutional law, is 
imported to decide the constitutionality of state laws regulating abortion.”). 
 35. Gonzalez v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 157 (2007) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Partial-
Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. 108-105, § 2, 117 Stat. 1201, 1206). 
 36. See id. at 132–68.  
 37. For an article exploring how this rationale is being used to and will likely continue to be used to 
undermine access to abortion, see Leah M. Litman, Potential Life in the Doctrine, 95 TEX. L. REV. 204 (2017). 
 38. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 177–81 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 39. Id. at 163 (majority opinion). 
 40. The legislative findings in Carhart also contained factual errors. See 550 U.S. at 175–76 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting). And upholding the law under those circumstances is also an indicia of rational basis review. United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (1938) (explaining that the Court will uphold a statute under 
rational basis review so long as “the question is at least debatable”). 
 41. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2309–13 (2016). 
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some women come to regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created 
and sustained. Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.42 
II.  DIGNITY 
The Justice’s decisions on abortion also reflect the two sides of the 
Justice’s commitment to dignity. We often think about the Justice’s writings on 
dignity in the context of his decisions on LGBT rights43 as Matt Coles 
mentioned,44 or in the context of decisions about the Eighth Amendment’s 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments.45 But the Justice’s commitment 
to dignity appears in the Justice’s writings on abortion as well.  
There’s a famous passage in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern 
Pennsylvania v. Casey in which the Court explains why it was not overturning 
the core holding of Roe. The controlling plurality said that every human being 
has the capacity to define their own concept of existence and the mysteries of 
life: 
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices a person may 
make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and autonomy, are central 
to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the heart of liberty is 
the right to define one’s own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, 
and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the 
attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.  
These considerations begin our analysis of the woman’s interest in 
terminating her pregnancy . . . .46 
That passage reflects the idea that each woman has the autonomy and 
dignity to decide when and whether to bring a child into existence, even if she 
chooses to have sex with a man. The Court made this explicit later on when it 
said: 
Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for others: for the 
woman who must live with the implications of her decision; . . . . Though 
abortion is conduct, it does not follow that the State is entitled to proscribe it in 
all instances. That is because the liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique 
to the human condition and so unique to the law. The mother who carries a child 
 
 42. Carhart, 550 U.S. 159 (emphasis added) (citations omitted); see also id. at 183 (Ginsburg, J., 
dissenting) (“Revealing in this regard, the Court invokes an antiabortion shibboleth for which it concededly has 
no reliable evidence . . . .”). 
 43. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (“They ask for equal dignity in the eyes of 
the law. The Constitution grants them that right.”); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“It suffices 
for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and 
their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”). 
 44. Matt Coles, The Profound Political but Elusive Legal Legacy of Justice Anthony Kennedy’s LGBT 
Decisions, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 1199 (2019). 
 45. E.g., Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1992 (2014) (“The Eighth Amendment’s protection of dignity 
reflects the Nation we have been, the Nation we are, and the Nation we aspire to be.”); Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 
493, 510 (2011) (“Prisoners retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons. Respect for that dignity 
animates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.”). 
 46. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851–52 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
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to full term is subject to anxieties, to physical constraints, to pain that only she 
must bear. That these sacrifices have from the beginning of the human race been 
endured by woman with a pride that ennobles her in the eyes of others and gives 
to the infant a bond of love cannot alone be grounds for the State to insist she 
make the sacrifice. Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to 
insist, without more, upon its own vision of the woman’s role, however dominant 
that vision has been in the course of our history and our culture. The destiny of 
the woman must be shaped to a large extent on her own conception of her spiritual 
imperatives and her place in society.47 
It is that concept of dignity that is often overlooked in the abortion cases 
because it appears more clearly in the LGBTQ cases or the Eighth Amendment 
cases. 
Indeed, in one of the cases upholding LGBTQ rights, Lawrence v. Texas, 
the Court specifically relied on Casey as a basis to overturn the Court’s prior 
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,48 which had allowed states to prohibit 
sodomy.49 As Lawrence explained, the passage in Casey that declared “[a]t the 
heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own concept of existence” made clear 
that “[t]he decision in Bowers would deny” “[p]ersons in a homosexual 
relationship” the right to “seek autonomy for these purposes.”50 Lawrence 
further explained that Casey had made clear why Bowers “fail[ed] to appreciate 
the extent of the liberty at stake” in the case: “To say,” as the Court did in 
Bowers, “that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain 
sexual conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward,” because it fails 
to recognize how the statute “touche[s] upon the most private human conduct, 
sexual behavior.”51  
In Whole Woman’s Health, there is another passage that reflects a similar 
idea about dignity. In explaining why the Texas regulations on abortion were 
unconstitutional, Justice Breyer wrote, and Justice Kennedy agreed, that the 
Texas regulations would have meant that women faced much longer waiting 
times in clinics, that they would have been forced to see doctors who have to see 
many, many, many more patients, and they would have been forced to travel 
great distances to clinics. Whole Woman’s Health reasoned: 
[I]n the face of no threat to women’s health, Texas seeks to force women to travel 
long distances to get abortions in crammed-to-capacity superfacilities. Patients 
seeking these services are less likely to get the kind of individualized attention, 
serious conversation, and emotional support that doctors at less taxed facilities 
may have offered. Healthcare facilities and medical professionals are not fungible 
commodities. Surgical centers attempting to accommodate sudden, vastly 
increased demand may find that quality of care declines.52 
 
 47. Id. at 852. 
 48. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 49. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 577–78. 
 50. Id. at 574 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851 (plurality opinion)). 
 51. Id. at 566–67. 
 52. Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292, 2318 (2016) (citation omitted). 
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For all of these reasons, the women would have been forced to accept a 
lower quality of care. That is, they would not have had the dignity of retaining 
and obtaining quality health care in making an important medical decision that 
would affect the remainder of their lives.53 That reasoning in Whole Woman’s 
Health reflects a capacity to see dignity in other people, including people who 
don’t look like us or belong to the same groups as we do or live their lives in the 
way we do. And it is emblematic of one of the great capacities of a Justice—and 
really of a human being—and one of the bright spots of Justice Kennedy’s 
jurisprudence and his career. 
Matt Coles mentioned, for example, that in the LGBTQ cases, the Justice 
recognized that the laws at issue in Romer,54 Obergefell,55 and Windsor56 all 
explicitly singled out LGBT individuals. Of course, in those cases, the states 
argued that those laws actually didn’t explicitly single out LGBT individuals. 
The states argued that the laws apply to any man—gay or straight—and said that 
any man could not marry another man and that any woman—gay or straight—
could not marry another woman.57 
Rejecting that argument required the judgment of a Justice who understood 
these laws are deeply, inextricability intertwined with LGBTQ identity and do 
not allow LGBTQ individuals to obtain the same recognition of the relationships 
of straight individuals. I think that that same capacity, the ability to recognize 
how laws burden some groups more than others even when you are not a member 
of that group, was also reflected in the words that the Justice used in Casey and 
in the opinion he joined in Whole Woman’s Health. 
Even though those ideas are sometimes present in the Justice’s opinions on 
abortion, I don’t know that anyone is capable of following through with that idea 
or ideal all of the time. In one of his later writings on the Court in Young v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc., the Justice addressed a case of alleged pregnancy 
discrimination in which a UPS employee was not given an accommodation after 
she became pregnant and was unable to perform the physical labor that was 
usually required at her job.58 Her employer refused to find duties that she could 
perform that would allow her to continue her pregnancy without risk of medical 
harm. 
 
 53. For articles elaborating on this argument, see Erwin Chemerinsky & Michele Goodwin, Abortion: A 
Woman’s Private Choice, 95 TEX. L. REV. 1189 (2017), and Greenhouse & Siegel, supra note 21, at 162. 
 54. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 55. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015). 
 56. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013). 
 57. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 80–81, Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (No. 14-556) (“Absolutely. But 
that’s the State’s whole point, is that we’re not drawing distinctions based on the identity, the orientation, or the 
choices of anyone.”); id. at 81 (“Oh, gosh, no, because the State doesn’t care about your sexual orientation. What 
the State cares about is that biological reality.”); id. (“A statute that facially classified based on sexual orientation 
would look very different. What these statutes do is they have disparate impact . . . .”). 
 58. 135 S. Ct. 1338 (2015). 
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The Justice wrote that there was no showing “of animus or hostility to 
pregnant women,” but that there still could be a concern about indifference 
though he suggested that indifference was “quite another matter” “as a matter of 
societal concern” from animus or hostility.59 That kind of indifference arguably 
exists, for example, when an individual is unable to understand the burdens that 
befall another group or is unable to appreciate how a governmental policy or law 
can exacerbate or reflect societal prejudices, networks of private discrimination, 
or legacies of governmental discrimination. 
Sometimes, that indifference was on display in the abortion cases the 
Justice decided. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, Justice Kennedy speculated that even 
though there was no evidence to support this claim, he thought it reasonable to 
believe that some number of women come to regret their abortions and that states 
could possibly restrict abortion on that basis.60 More recently, in National 
Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (NIFLA), the Justice joined an 
opinion that offered a questionable distinction between informed-consent 
requirements on abortion and informed-consent requirements on pregnancy 
counseling.61 The distinction he embraced suggested a lack of understanding 
about the two procedures, or at least a lack of understanding about the 
perspectives of people who would undergo those procedures. In Casey, the Court 
had upheld a law that required doctors to disclose alternative options to patients 
seeking abortions (and also to disclose information related to the abortion). 
NIFLA distinguished that law, which the Court had upheld, from the California 
law that the Court invalidated. The California law required pregnancy crisis 
centers, which do not perform abortions, to disclose to their patients other 
options besides carrying a pregnancy to term, and specifically to advise them 
about the option of having an abortion with the assistance of public funding. And 
NIFLA did so on this basis: “The licensed notice at issue here is not an informed-
consent requirement or any other regulation of professional conduct. The notice 
does not facilitate informed consent to a medical procedure. In fact, it is not tied 
to a procedure at all.”62 
Given the shockingly high rate of maternal mortalities in the United States, 
and the relative safety of the abortion procedure, it is odd that the Court 
suggested states could require abortion providers to offer medical disclosures, 
but could not require medical providers intending to promote childbirth to do the 
same.63 
 
 59. Id. at 1366–67 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 60. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 61. 138 S. Ct. 2361 (2018). 
 62. Id. at 2373. 
 63. See Michael Ollove, A Shocking Number of U.S. Women Still Die of Childbirth. California Is Doing 
Something About That., WASH. POST (Nov. 4, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/a-shocking-number-of-us-women-still-die-from-childbirth-california-is-doing-something-about-
that/2018/11/02/11042036-d7af-11e8-a10f-b51546b10756_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_ 
term=.e1416c88b3fe. And the maternal mortality rates for black women are significantly higher than maternal 
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Or think of the cases involving the Hyde Amendment or the cases blessing 
states’ ability to refuse to cover abortions as part of Medicaid insurance 
programs.64 In those cases, the Court relied on reasoning along the lines of “the 
state actually didn’t cause an individual woman to become poor. Therefore, it 
doesn’t have to fund her ability to obtain an abortion.”65 
That logic suggests the Justices were unable to put themselves in the 
position of women who might rely on Medicaid as their primary health insurance 
and to understand how women, through a combination of lack of access to birth 
control, sex education, contraceptives, and economic opportunities, together 
with institutional and cultural sexism and private discrimination, might find 
themselves in a position of not feeling ready or equipped to have or support a 
child.66 
That same inability to understand the prejudice and effects of a 
governmental policy when that prejudice or those effects do not fall on you 
comes up in other areas as well, such as voting rights cases. You can imagine 
taking some of the same language that Matt Coles was quoting from the Justices’ 
writings on LGBTQ equality and applying it to, for example, voting 
discrimination.67  
That is, if we want to ask whether a voting restriction burdens a particular 
group, why don’t we think of that in terms of dignity? Why don’t we think of 
voting restrictions as denying someone equal participation in society, 
particularly voting restrictions that fall disproportionately on particular 
groups?68  
The inability to recognize how some governmental policies or laws 
disproportionately affect certain groups is, in part, a consequence of the fact that 
 
mortality rates in the United States in general. See Nina Martin, Black Mothers Keep Dying After Giving Birth. 
Shalon Irvin’s Story Explains Why, NPR (Dec. 7, 2017, 7:51 PM), https://www.npr.org/2017/12/07/ 
568948782/black-mothers-keep-dying-after-giving-birth-shalon-irvings-story-explains-why. 
 64. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 
(1977). 
 65. See, e.g., Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 507 (1989) (“[O]ur cases have recognized 
that the Due Process Clauses generally confer no affirmative right to governmental aid, even where such aid 
may be necessary to secure life, liberty, or property interests of which the government itself may not deprive the 
individual.” (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. 
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989))); Harris, 448 U.S. at 318; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474 (“An indigent 
woman who desires an abortion suffers no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut’s decision to fund 
childbirth . . . .”). 
 66. For articles expanding on this argument, see Chemerinsky & Goodwin, supra note 53, at 1238–44, and 
Michele Goodwin & Erwin Chemerinsky, Pregnancy, Poverty, and the State, 127 YALE L.J. 1270 (2018) 
(reviewing KHIARA M. BRIDGES, THE POVERTY OF PRIVACY RIGHTS (2017)). 
 67. For an article expanding on this analogy, see Ellen D. Katz, What the Marriage Equality Cases Tell Us 
About Voter ID, 2015 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 211 (2015). 
 68. Compare, e.g., Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018), with id. at 2335–60 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting), 
and N.C. State Conference of the NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2016). In Heart of Atlanta Motel, 
Inc. v. United States, the Court stated that a “deprivation of personal dignity . . . surely accompanies denials of 
equal access to public establishments.” 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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dignity is amorphous. So a jurisprudence of dignity necessarily depends on who 
the decisionmakers are, and how they conceive of dignity. Dignity is, in some 
sense, in the eye of the beholder—whether they can see other people’s dignity, 
and understanding how other peoples’ dignity might be affected. A 
jurisprudence of dignity means that we rely on individual judges or justices to 
recognize the dignity of other people and to understand how their dignity might 
be implicated or affected by a particular law. But different decisionmakers’ 
different conceptions of dignity might be more or less problematic, and different 
decisionmakers might have different capacities to see the dignity in others who 
are not like them. 
In the last five to ten to fifteen years, we have increasingly seen calls to 
recognize the dignity of fetuses or to recognize claims of personhood or the 
dignity of potential life.69 Borrowing on that conception of dignity, states are 
increasingly justifying laws that would restrict abortion in the name of potential 
life and fetal personhood.70 Is that conception of dignity going to be one that the 
current members of the Supreme Court or new appointments to the federal courts 
are going to recognize? Is that the concept of dignity that they are going to sign 
off on?  
III.  CIVILITY 
Those are some of the limits to and promises of the Justice’s commitment 
to dignity. There are also promise and limits to the Justice’s commitment to 
civility. 
When I say civility, I mean the notion that when we talk about a difficult 
issue, we do so respectfully and we ensure that both sides feel heard and 
acknowledged. This was, as Judge Feinerman suggested, one of the great gifts 
that Justice Kennedy gave to litigants, to the Court, and to the lawyerly 
community. It really felt as though it was the case, and I think it was the case, 
that everyone had a chance of having their argument prevail when they made an 
argument before him at the Supreme Court.71 Some people may question 
whether that is still the case today.  
 
 69. See Joshua J. Craddock, Note, Protecting Prenatal Persons: Does the Fourteenth Amendment Prohibit 
Abortion?, 40 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 539 (2017); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Plausibility of Personhood, 
74 OHIO ST. L.J. 13 (2013); Adrian Vermuele (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 22, 2019, 2:29 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/1087839616504397824 (“Which is why SCOTUS should not merely 
overturn Roe and Casey, but declare that the unborn child is a person protected by the 5th and 14th Amendments. 
(Justice Brennan’s opinions, and the ‘human dignity’ principle of Obergefell, will be particularly useful here).”); 
Adrian Vermuele (@Vermeullarmine), TWITTER (Jan. 23, 2019, 3:44 PM), 
https://twitter.com/Vermeullarmine/status/1088221059319545857 (“All the dark tools of Romer/Obergefell etc. 
will be pressed into service. It’s heightened-rational-basis irrational to extend homicide statutes so far and no 
farther, and/or the unborn are a suspect class, and/or fundamental rights talk, and/or outlawry, and/or human 
dignity.”). 
 70. See Litman, supra note 37. 
 71. This is also not necessarily a universally good thing. Some arguments probably should not have any 
chance of prevailing at the Supreme Court, including some of the arguments that Justice Kennedy voted for. 
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Even as Justice Kennedy would rule against both sides (since he would 
inevitably rule for both of them too), he would attempt to do so in a way that 
made both sides feel heard.  
There were, of course, arguably some exceptions. In Gonzalez v. Carhart, 
he infamously had a throwaway line in which he suggested that even though 
there was no evidence to support this proposition, he surmised that some number 
of women would regret their abortions.72 All reliable medical evidence suggests 
that is not actually true.  
But when Justice Kennedy would rule on matters of LGBT rights or 
abortion, he would generally do so by recognizing the good faith arguments on 
the other side. For example, in Obergefell v. Hodges, he explained that even 
though the Court held that states could not refuse to recognize same-sex 
marriages, disagreement with same-sex marriage occasionally reflected good 
faith religious views.73 So too, in his abortion cases: He would recognize that 
the matter of abortion implicated good faith, sincerely held views about when 
life begins.74  
On the one hand, this is a good thing. After all, we like the idea of civility, 
and of recognizing and acknowledging both sides. There are, however, risks to 
this approach. What do I mean by that? Those lines can sometimes be picked up 
on and seized on in order to chip away at the relevant constitutional protections 
and constitutional rights. After Obergefell, of course, came Masterpiece Cake 
Shop, when several Justices seized on the idea that there can be good faith 
religious objections to same-sex marriage as a way to conclude that individuals 
cannot be forced to comply with generally applicable civil rights requirements 
when the individuals have religious objections to LGBTQ relationships or same-
sex marriage.75 
That same idea is also used to justify restrictions on reproductive justice. 
For example, pharmacists argue that they have a right to not be compelled to 
 
 72. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
 73. See 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015) (“Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that 
conclusion based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and neither they nor their beliefs 
are disparaged here. But when that sincere, personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the 
necessary consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or 
stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied.”). 
 74. See Nat’l Inst. of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 2361, 2379 (2018) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring) (“It does appear that viewpoint discrimination is inherent in the design and structure of this Act. 
This law is a paradigmatic example of the serious threat presented when government seeks to impose its own 
message in the place of individual speech, thought, and expression. For here the State requires primarily pro-life 
pregnancy centers to promote the State’s own preferred message advertising abortions. This compels individuals 
to contradict their most deeply held beliefs, beliefs grounded in basic philosophical, ethical, or religious precepts, 
or all of these. And the history of the Act’s passage and its underinclusive application suggest a real possibility 
that these individuals were targeted because of their beliefs.”); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 
833, 852 (1992) (plurality opinion) (“Abortion is a unique act. It is an act fraught with consequences for 
others . . . depending on one’s beliefs, for the life or potential life that is aborted.”). 
 75. See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1734 (2018) 
(Gorsuch, J., concurring); id. at 1740 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
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fulfill prescriptions either for Plan B or other forms of contraception because it 
is contrary to their religious beliefs. This was also the argument on behalf of the 
individuals and entities that claimed they should be exempt from the Affordable 
Care Act’s requirement for insurance to cover contraception access.76 
This is also an argument that government officials, such as the former 
Office of Refugee Resettlement director, Scott Lloyd, have relied on. Lloyd 
invoked this line of reasoning to argue that he does not have to temporarily 
release women from government custody so that they can obtain abortions.77 He 
argued that his religious beliefs include the belief that abortion is immoral and 
that he therefore does not have to allow women in his custody (government 
custody) to be able to obtain abortions. 
Justice Kennedy’s civility-focused approach to deciding issues thus can be 
used as a way to undermine protections for certain groups.  
And that is a problem if we think there is a limit to how much the civility 
of our words can do. I mentioned the example of Scott Lloyd, the director of the 
Office of Refugee Resettlement, who was not allowing undocumented minor 
women in his custody to obtain abortions. He was arguing that he, as their 
guardian, had the authority to conclude that it is in their best interest not to get 
an abortion even when they are victims of rape.78 
Are there any words he could use—civil, polite, respectful discourse—to 
justify those actions? Would civil language be sufficient to make his actions 
legitimate? Is civil discourse enough, or is there some limit to what we can say 
is civil based only on the words that are used, rather than the actions that are 
taken?79  
We can make the same point by focusing on the Justice’s final writings on 
the Court, or even about the Justice’s decision to retire. As I wrote in a tribute 
shortly after the Justice retired: 
[T]he Justice’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii . . . offered a gentle reminder that 
it is “imperative” and an “urgent necessity” that officials “adhere to the 
Constitution.” The Justice voted to reverse the lower courts’ injunction against 
President Trump’s ban on entry into the United States by nationals of several 
Muslim-majority countries. The ban came after the President’s campaign promise 
of a “total and complete shutdown of Muslims entering the United States.” 
 
 76. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). For a longer discussion of such claims, 
see Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience Claims in Religion 
and Politics, 124 YALE L.J. 2516 (2015); Douglas NeJaime & Reva B. Siegel, Religious Exemptions and 
Antidiscrimination Law in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 128 YALE L.J.F. 201 (2018). 
 77. See Motion for Preliminary Injunction at Exhibit C, Garza v. Hargan, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145 (D.D.C. 
2018) (No. 1:17-cv-02122); Notice of Filing Redacted ORR Pursuant to Order, Garza, 304 F. Supp. 3d 145 (No. 
1:17-cv-02122); see also Application for a Stay Pending Appeal, Hargan v. Garza, No. 17-A655 (U.S. Sept. 18, 
2018); Emergency Motion to Stay, Garza v. Hargan, No. 17-5276 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2017). 
 78. See Notice of Filing Redacted ORR Pursuant to Order, supra note 77. 
 79. For the argument that civility and etiquette must include some judgment about the underlying actions 
themselves, see Leslie Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Etiquette of Animus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133 
(2018). 
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The Justice’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii contained his last words on 
the Court, and in some ways, it is fitting that he went out on his unshakeable faith 
in the power of words—in this case, his words—to redeem us. It’s a belief that 
he’s held for a long time, and it very much represents who he is. In a speech 
fifteen years ago to the American Bar Association, for example, the Justice 
implored the legal profession that “[n]o public official should echo the sentiments 
of the Arizona sheriff who once said with great pride that he ‘runs a very bad 
jail.’” 
That sheriff, of course, was Joe Arpaio, the man who was convicted of 
violating a federal court order that directed him to stop systematically violating 
the Fourth Amendment. In August 2017, President Trump pardoned Mr. Arpaio. 
Other members of the Trump Administration have similarly championed the 
former sheriff, a man who used state power in brutal and coercive ways that often 
fell on the Latinx community, as a defender of the rule of law. 
Perhaps there is something of a sad irony to how this all played out. A man 
who valued decorum so much he practically apologized for every one of his 
dissents retired during the administration of, and thus solidified the power of, a 
man who began his presidential campaign by referring to Mexicans as criminals 
and rapists, and who bragged, on tape, about grabbing women by the pussy. 
But perhaps there are some lessons here as well as some ironies. If the real 
threat to civil society is having the audacity to call a racist a racist or a fascist a 
fascist, perhaps the “civil” thing to do is to hand that person the keys to the 
kingdom and ask them to play nice. It’s a relatable decision, if nothing else; I’ve 
come to appreciate the difficulty of calling out someone you know and perhaps 
like, or someone you worked with (or perhaps someone you worked for), for 
doing something that may enable evil, even if unintentionally, and even though 
they may have had (otherwise) legitimate reasons for doing so.80 
CONCLUSION 
What I wanted to note is how the Justice’s abortion jurisprudence illustrates 
his commitment to civility, his commitment to dignity, and his commitment to 
institutional integrity. All of those commitments are worth celebrating, though 




 80. Leah M. Litman, In Tribute: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, 132 HARV. L. REV. 17, 20–22 (2018) 
(footnotes omitted) (first quoting Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424 (2018) (Kennedy, J., concurring); then 
quoting id. at 2423; and then quoting Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, Speech at the American Bar Association 
Annual Meeting (Aug. 9, 2003), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/ 
sp_08-09-03). 
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